ASV Byzantine Text
Now, then, since it is the law which hath forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it doth the affections which are impediments to justice.
13 translations of 23 that include the deuterocanon
Now, then, since it is the law which hath forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it doth the affections which are impediments to justice.
In fact, since the law has told us not to covet, I could prove to you all the more that reason is able to control desires. Just so it is with the emotions that hinder one from justice.
Now, then, since it is the law which has forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it does the affections which are impediments to justice.
Now, then, since it is the law which has forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it does the affections which are impediments to justice.
Now, then, since it is the law which has forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it does the affections which are impediments to justice.
Maintenant donc, puisque c'est la loi qui nous a interdit de convoiter, je vous persuaderai d'autant plus facilement que le raisonnement est capable de gouverner nos convoitises, comme il le fait pour les affections qui sont des entraves à la justice.
Entonces, ya que es la misma ley la que nos ha prohibido desear, les podré convencer mucho más fácil de que la razón puede gobernar nuestros malos deseos, igual que domina los afectos que no nos dejan actuar con justicia.
Ahora bien, puesto que es la ley la que nos ha prohibido desear, os persuadiré mucho más fácilmente de que el razonamiento es capaz de gobernar nuestras lujurias, al igual que lo hace con los afectos que son impedimentos para la justicia.
Now, then, since it is the law which has forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it does the affections which are impediments to justice.
Now, then, since it is the law which has forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it does the affections which are impediments to justice.
Now, then, since it is the law which has forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it does the affections which are impediments to justice.
Now, then, since it is the law which has forbidden us to desire, I shall much the more easily persuade you, that reasoning is able to govern our lusts, just as it does the affections which are impediments to justice.
Καίτοι ὅτε μὴ ἐπιθυμεῖν εἴρηκεν ἡμᾶς ὁ νόμος, πολὺ πλέον πείσαιμʼ ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὅτι τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν δύναται ὁ λογισμὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κωλυτικῶν τῆς δικαιοσύνης παθῶν.